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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

21 June 1978

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The articles in this publication are prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center primarily for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.


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COLOMBIA: Economic Impact of Narcotics and Interdiction

Illegal economic activities, mainly narcotics trafficking, account for a large and growing share of Colombia's national output. Clandestine exports alone probably exceed \$1 billion annually, compared to legal, official exports of \$2.4 billion last year. Marijuana cultivation is a major source of income for rural workers, particularly subsistence farmers, and the high profits from narcotics, particularly cocaine, have helped finance urban construction and legitimate business ventures, significantly supplementing legitimate private capital markets. The existence of the clandestine economy, however, has seriously complicated economic policymaking.

A drastic cut in marijuana cultivation would eliminate a key source of rural income, would lower living standards, and would stimulate migration to the already overcrowded urban areas. The resulting influx to the cities would increase the burden on social services and add to the drain on government resources. It would also increase the risk of political destabilization through economically induced social unrest. The need to maintain public order in such an environment could even prompt a shift to a more repressive and less democratic government.

Successful interdiction of the cocaine traffic alone would be far less disruptive to the economy since relatively few people are actually dependent on illicit incomes. While a major cutback in cocaine earnings would stem the flow of clandestine earnings into legitimate capital markets, the resulting contraction could be largely offset by temporary liberalization of credit and increased flow of public sector investment funds.

Although more successful interdiction of Colombia's narcotics traffic would create serious problems, it would improve Bogota's ability to implement fiscal and monetary policies. Government efforts to reduce inflation have been hampered by increased flows of capital

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and illicit profits from narcotics trade to the legal sectors of the economy. For example, the government's efforts to stem inflation following the 1975 boom in coffee earnings were initially unsuccessful due in part to the strength and vigor of the illegal economy. As a result the government had to make austerity even harsher; the burden of which has been borne entirely by the legitimate economy. The resulting decline in real wages triggered labor violence in October 1977 and again in May this year, while legitimate businesses faced major cash flow problems.

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CARIBBEAN: Bahama Drug Smuggling on the Rise


For centuries the Caribbean islands have been transit points for international smuggling that in recent years has included highly profitable narcotics trafficking. The Bahama Islands, in particular, have become an increasingly important link in the drug chain from Latin America to the US.

As enforcement and interdiction programs in mainland Latin American countries have become more effective, the resilient and resourceful drug traffickers have redirected more of their activities through the Caribbean. The Bahamas, a collection of 700 small islands off the lower southeastern coast of Florida, is already a prominent point in the bulk movement of Colombian marijuana. Recent arrest and seizure statistics in Nassau indicate that cocaine smuggling is also increasing drastically. The Bahamas are attractive to marijuana traffickers primarily for their proximity to the US mainland and because they offer ports of call on two major international shipping lanes, the Yucatan and Windward Passages. Commercial cargo vessels, as well as light aircraft, are transporting multiton shipments of marijuana from the north coast of Colombia via the islands.

According to the US Embassy in Nassau, the increase in cocaine smuggling through the Bahamas appears to result from several factors: the availability of regularly scheduled direct commercial flights from Latin American points to Nassau; the relative ease with which cocaine is distributed from Nassau to the US east coast; and, perhaps most important, the growing reputation of the Bahamas as a "low risk" area. The "low risk" reputation is the result of what seems to be an unofficial, albeit widely practiced, tendency by the judiciary to collect fines for the national treasury rather than to sentence and imprison smugglers. The fines and forfeited payments come from traffickers who invariably jump bail and are able to flee the island with little chance of recapture. Some of the fines and bail money may go into the pockets

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of judges rather than into the official coffers. Corruption among Bahamian officials is not unknown, nor particularly uncommon. A number of investigations were conducted into alleged "irregularities" involving among others, the national police, customs, and the Fox Hill penal institution, but there were no conclusive findings.

The problem of drug control in the Bahamas stems not as much from a question of moral integrity on the part of officials as it does from a physical limitation on what even the most honest officials can be expected to do under present circumstances. Considering the geography of the area--thousands of small cays, hidden inlets, and clandestine airstrips on the out islands--the lack of manpower and equipment, the volume of tourist travel, and the island's underdeveloped economy, it is understandable why the drug trade has flourished.

Even though Bahamian authorities are making arrests and interdicting some drug shipments, enough escapes detection to ensure that the trade will continue. Drug smugglers are gaining confidence in their ability to physically resist the authorities; recent violent confrontations on some of the out islands have resulted in poorly equipped police forces being outmaneuvered and overpowered. Bahamian police boats, currently being refurbished for duty with the national defense force, will not be available for action until the end of this year.

There are serious implications in the expanding Bahamian drug trade. If marijuana can be shipped profitably and cocaine can be smuggled with ease and virtual impunity, then perhaps Asian heroin will begin to be routed through the Bahamas in increasing quantities. In a related vein, if there are more drugs available in the islands, there is a greater likelihood that an indigenous drug problem will develop. Finally, the Bahamian economy--based predominantly on the tourist industry--is susceptible to infiltration by and subsequent dependence on the lucrative drug trade.

As with other countries in the hemisphere that are experiencing drug problems, success in developing an effective bilateral drug control program in the Bahamas will depend largely on educating officials in Nassau on

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the scope and seriousness of the issue, and, on securing ongoing cooperation from the highest Bahamian leaders.

Thus far, Prime Minister Pindling--a compromise politician who finds it difficult to make decisions--has had little to say publicly about the drug problem, perhaps an indication that he does not regard it as a pressing issue. The degree of seriousness, however, with which he ultimately regards his country's burgeoning drug trade and the extent to which he is prepared to commit his time and energy will determine in part how successful Washington will be in plugging up yet another hole in the Latin American narcotics sieve.

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PAKISTAN: An Uninspiring Approach to Narcotics Control

Pakistani officials appear to have little interest in narcotics control. Addiction is not considered a significant domestic problem and Pakistan is not believed to have any obligation to use its limited resources, or deprive farmers of income in order to help solve the richer industrialized nations' addiction problems. There have been notable exceptions, however, as in the case of the recent successful raid on a morphine/heroin conversion laboratory earlier this month, after much prompting from US representatives in Islamabad.

The overall impetus for narcotics control comes from abroad. The Pakistanis need economic, diplomatic, and military support from Western nations--especially the US--and recognize that their narcotics policies are an important factor both in bilateral relations with individual Western nations and in Pakistan's image in the West. Narcotics control is, however, only one of many issues in Pakistan's foreign relations, and Islamabad's willingness to pursue narcotics control policies is influenced by the willingness of other countries to support Pakistan on other issues. Declining support from the US and disagreements on problems such as Pakistan's nuclear plans, however, have not been the major factor in Pakistani reluctance to pursue narcotics control vigorously. Far more important has been the internal situation.


The poppy-growing areas of Pakistan--the North-West Frontier Province and the adjoining Federally Administered Tribal Areas--are of secondary political and economic importance to any Pakistani government. The government--whether civilian or military--depends on support in the Punjab, and to a lesser extent the Sind, and little if any opium is produced in either province.

Nevertheless, the government in Islamabad has no desire to add to its difficulties by creating unnecessary problems in the historically troublesome NWFP.

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Moreover, Islamabad's concern with secessionist tendencies in the province and a belief that Afghanistan and the USSR would exploit any dissidence in an effort to break up Pakistan give additional weight to arguments against policies on narcotics, or any other issue, likely to antagonize the people on the Frontier. Officials at the provincial and local levels, who must carry out anti-narcotics programs, are much less likely to be concerned with the foreign policy benefits of narcotics control, and give much higher priority to maintaining peace.

The part of Pakistan in which opium is produced is generally divided into three areas:

- The tribal areas, some under federal administration, others under provincial control. The authority of Islamabad and Peshawar, the provincial capital, is very limited in this area. The enforcement of unpopular laws can require a military expedition, and tribal rebellions--although generally minor--are frequent.
- The "merged" areas, former princely states merged into the NWFP. Provincial and federal control is considerably greater in this part of the province, but still limited in many places.*
- The "settled" areas--those parts of the NWFP which have long been under central government control.

This division of the poppy-growing area, however, gives only a general picture of the degree of government authority. In some parts of the settled areas, for example, official authority is probably as weak as any place in the tribal areas. Moreover, law enforcement is complicated, even in places where the government is in full control, by the possibility of a reaction in a part of the province where central authority is weak.

*The unofficial "tribal areas" correspond closely to the official "Federally Administered Tribal Areas"; the "merged areas" to the official "Provincially Administered Tribal Areas."

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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

(Editor's Note: These items, produced for other CIA publications, do not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. They are included here because they concern developing situations that could impact on the international narcotics control effort.)

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COLOMBIA: Turbay by a Nose

The ruling Liberal Party's candidate, Julio Cesar Turbay, squeaked through to a narrow victory in the 4 June presidential election after the lead had seen-sawed between him and his Conservative opponent, Belisario Betancur. At one point, both contestants claimed victory. The National Registry--which maintains the official vote count--announced Turbay's win on 6 June. The final count must still be ratified by the Electoral Court; Turbay seems certain to be declared President-elect and will begin a four-year term on 7 August.

Turbay--who took 48.7 percent of the estimated 4.7 million votes--immediately rejected accusations of fraud and offered to hold a recount. Spokesmen for Betancur--who captured 46.9 percent of the vote--have challenged the authenticity of the count, and Betancur has yet to concede. If he contests the results in the courts, an extended period of political uncertainty will follow. A Conservative former presidential candidate discounts the possibility of violence over the disputed returns, but stresses that the situation will be tense. Senior leaders in both major parties appear to be counseling patience among their supporters and seem ready to abide by any final decision.

Turbay's disappointing showing--a narrow margin of approximately 140,000 votes, compared with earlier predictions of a quarter to a half million majority--appears to rest as much with his pedantic campaign style and tactics as with popular enthusiasm for his Conservative

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challenger. Turbay's decision to limit campaign appearances to major cities undoubtedly cost him votes in smaller cities and towns. But even this urban strategy had its failings when Bogota and Medellin, the country's two principal cities, were won by Betancur by respectable margins. Furthermore, Turbay's inability to resolve divisions within his party and put at rest charges of corruption directed against him and his family was a liability. Betancur, on the other hand, picked up additional ballots with his relaxed, outgoing personality and his courting of votes in smaller population centers.

Political and social turmoil preceding the voting led the government to mobilize some 200,000 troops to maintain order on election day, and as a precaution the Defense Ministry is keeping these troops on duty until further notice.

As expected, electoral apathy was high. Approximately 68 percent of the eligible voters failed to cast their ballot. Turbay's lack of a popular mandate, coupled with the Conservatives' nearly equal support at the polls, may force the new President-elect to continue certain aspects of the biparty National Front coalition, which was to end this year, in order to preserve national unity.

It is generally expected that Turbay's administration will largely continue policies initiated under Lopez. Turbay has indicated, for example, that he intends to support Lopez' drug control program. Unlike Lopez, however, Turbay will begin his term as a weak and unpopular president, and serious challenges await him. He has difficult labor, crime, and student problems to face, and he still has to convince his countrymen that he is of presidential timber.

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Tension

Tension is rising in the Dominican Republic because the official certification of Antonio Guzman's victory in the presidential election last month is being delayed by legal challenges and administrative haggling. President Balaguer is likely to meet increasing pressure to speed up the process and thus to allay growing suspicion that a few top military officers may somehow intervene to prevent Guzman from taking office in August.

Leaders of the military establishment met with Guzman early this month and publicly pledged to back his administration after he agreed to hold his leftist supporters in check and not to interfere with the armed forces. Nonetheless, a faction led by Major General Neit Nivar, the chief of the national police, has continued a backstairs campaign to block certification of Guzman's election and to excite anti-Communist sentiment favorable to new elections or a military coup. Nivar masterminded the military intervention that briefly halted the vote count last month.

Since the election Balaguer's diehard supporters in the ruling party--backed by Nivar--have succeeded in ousting both the chairman and the secretary of the Central Electoral Commission and have swamped the commission with legal challenges that have blocked an official declaration of a winner. In an apparent effort at intimidation, Nivar's police temporarily detained the head of the commission's computer center and, according to the press, have remained at the center to monitor the final tabulations.

For his part, Balaguer has publicly congratulated Guzman and has received him twice in the national palace. He has also authorized his apparent successor to visit

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various government departments and has assigned security protection to Guzman and his running mate. Balaguer has also strongly opposed a Nivar-backed effort to ram through pro-military legislation without the approval of the new administration and has flatly rejected Nivar's attempt to have a rival general dismissed.

Balaguer is aware of the growing unease caused by the vote dispute but refuses to intervene. He told the US Ambassador on 16 June that he fully expects to step down in August and that legal challenges aimed primarily at congressional and municipal returns would run their course in accordance with the constitution. He also expressed complete confidence in his control of a military organization seriously hampered by factional rivalries.

Balaguer, however, has not called off Nivar or restrained the extremists in the ruling party. This ambiguity has greatly increased tensions among a population that generally accepts the unofficial Guzman victory but is becoming increasingly suspicious of behind-the-scenes maneuvering. The majority of the military and most political forces favor a peaceful transition and are now almost certain to step up pressure on Balaguer to resolve the confusion. They especially want him to rein in Nivar, whose provocative actions could lead to a civil conflict.

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IRAN: Upsurge in Religious Dissidence

The Shah of Iran sometime during the long, hot summer probably will face another round of the violent demonstrations that have left an estimated 50 to 60 persons dead since early January. A dialogue has begun between emissaries of the Shah and Muslim leaders but fundamental issues remain unresolved. The spate of serious clashes staged by conservative Muslim demonstrators over the past four months has increased concern that the Muslim opposition, dormant since the mid-1960s, may be developing into a long-term security problem for the Shah. Addressing a group of academics last week, the Shah frankly predicted a year or two of unrest--a price he said the government must pay for its policy of political liberalization.

The potential for trouble is not limited to the large conservative Muslim community. Moderate to left-wing critics of the government, who are united with dissident Muslim clergymen only in their opposition to the Shah, may encourage their followers to swell the ranks of conservative religious demonstrators. Spokesmen for the moderate political opposition have expressed sympathy for Muslim militants killed in recent disturbances and have applauded the demand of Muslim leaders for a more representative form of government. This suggests that the moderate left may formalize an alliance of convenience with the extremist Muslim right, which could be a dangerous development for the regime.

The politicized clergy, who oppose the Shah on religious grounds, have been able to exploit other popular grievances--inflation, poor housing, and the inadequate distribution of basic commodities--that are chronic problems in urban working class areas. Militant students,

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a perennial headache for the Shah, added their weight to religious demonstrations this year and are likely to be involved in future flareups.

The terrorists may believe that the violence has created a favorable political climate for terrorist actions against government officials and US nationals. The US community numbers about 37,000 and presents a virtually indefensible target to the terrorists. The assassination of US nationals would serve the terrorists' principal objective of focusing domestic and international attention on opposition to the Shah.

The civil disorders this year have exposed some glaring deficiencies in the ability of the police to contain mob violence. On one occasion, the police panicked and fired into a crowd of demonstrators, killing 12. During another demonstration, the police abandoned their posts, forcing the government to call in the Army to restore order. Police units nationwide have been severely taxed since the first incidents in January, thus impairing their effectiveness in dealing with future outbreaks. The government may again call upon the Army to support the police. Designated units have been placed on standby for possible riot-control duty. Even though many enlisted men sympathize with the conservative Muslims, calling into question their effectiveness in quelling prolonged Muslim-instigated disturbances, troops have been used effectively in dealing with past disturbances of limited scope and duration.

The Shah recognizes the need to build better relations between the Court and the religious community. His highly publicized pilgrimage to an important Shia Muslim shrine in late May and the recent removal of SAVAK chief General Nasiri, known as a hard-liner in dealing with dissidents, were intended to placate the religious opposition.

Emissaries of the Shah are in contact with religious leaders, and they may reach some understanding on the need to curb further violence. There are, however, many obstacles in the way of a durable political compromise between the Shah and his conservative Muslim opponents, who believe that reforms instituted by the Shah and his father threaten the future of Islam in Iran. The Shah

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is gambling that his program of modernization has enough political support to allow him to take stern measures, if necessary, against the conservative Muslims. [REDACTED]

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AFGHANISTAN: GOVERNMENT BALKS AT PROPOSED ANTI - OPIUM POPPY CLAUSES IN LOAN AGREEMENT. Kabul has sum-
marily rejected an attempt by the Asian Development Bank to introduce anti - opium poppy clauses into a loan agreement or to attach qualifying side-letters similar to those included in US aid agreements. The director of the ADB told Embassy officials in Kabul recently that the Afghanistan Government adamantly refused to accept the proposed anti - opium poppy language which the bank wanted to include in the \$1.6 million West Seraj Project agreement. Instead, Afghan officials suggested "greatly watered down" language, which has been submitted to the ADB headquarters in Manila for approval. American observers in Kabul interpret the strong Afghan reaction to the bank's proposal as evidence that the new government, despite its protestations to the contrary, is--for the moment at least--no more willing than its predecessor to come to grips with the opium production problem in the area. [REDACTED]

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BULGARIA-LAOS: OPIUM TRANSACTION CONFIRMED. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), through its statistical reporting procedures, has received confirmation that Bulgaria acquired raw opium from the Government of Laos earlier this year. The Bulgarian statistical report to the INCB for the first quarter of 1978, as required by international agreement, discloses the importation of four tons of opium from Laos. The report lacks any explanatory note concerning the transaction; and there has been no information from Laos concerning the deal. The INCB was created in 1961 by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs to monitor and regulate the movement of drugs for licit purposes. As a signatory to the convention, Bulgaria was obligated to record the transaction, and Sofia probably views the quarterly report entry as fulfilling that requirement. [REDACTED]

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BURMA: OPERATION MOHEIN V TO BE LAUNCHED SOON. American observers in Rangoon now expect the fifth phase of the Burmese military operation--designated MOHEIN (Roaring Sky) V--against opium refineries and narcotics traffickers in the Thai-Burma border area, to get under way possibly within the next two weeks--weather permitting. The operation was originally slated for mid-May but was postponed, primarily because of Burmese Communist Party insurgency operations in mid-to-late May and because of the projected trip by key Burmese military leaders to China.

The previous antinarcotics military operation--MOHEIN IV--was launched on 12 April in the border area, and a record amount of opium-refining equipment and chemicals and partially refined opium reportedly were seized, but, because of the advance warning, most of the traffickers and workers escaped. Although the three-pronged attack was judged a success in terms of seizures and in terms of the temporary disruption of narcotics processing, American military representatives in Rangoon, who later toured the area, concluded that, from a military standpoint, MOHEIN IV had serious shortcomings--helicopters apparently were not effectively employed, movement of military units on foot gave advance warning of the impending operation, and the armed forces remained in the area only a relatively short time, precluding necessary followup operations.

In the wake of MOHEIN IV, those involved in narcotics related activities in the Thai-Burma border area now anticipate further military operations against them. Although some of them have resumed limited refining operation in nearby areas, albeit with shortages of chemicals, and some probably returned to their former locations after the troops moved out, MOHEIN V will now face a more illusive,

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and probably a more belligerent, target--at least in ambushes and other guerrilla tactics--than the Burmese forces experienced in the previous military operation. [REDACTED]

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NEPAL: UN DRUG CONTROL PROJECT PROCEEDS SLOWLY. The UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control has launched an experimental project in Nepal aimed primarily at developing a source of income that could substitute for various drug-producing crops. The project, which involves a nonmulberry silk operation, would contribute to rural development as well as offer an alternative to narcotics production. (Although opium production is not a major problem in Nepal, there have been domestic pressures, allegedly encouraged by the USSR, to promote a government-controlled opium industry for pharmaceutical purposes.) The UN team working on the UNFDAC project reports that, although the technical aspects of the mission have gone well and the proposed site for the project is acceptable, they have experienced considerable frustration in trying to deal with the government at the policymaking level. The primary problem may have resulted from the failure to focus sufficiently on the drug-control aspects of the project when it was first proposed. Local leaders were attracted to the silk industry idea initially, but lost interest when problems pertaining to necessary new legislation and training requirements were raised. Nepalese leaders have now made it clear that the project as currently outlined is not acceptable, primarily because it would require Nepal to become a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, a move which Nepal is not yet ready to take.

The Embassy in Kathmandu has reported that the initial lack of success does not mean that the project is lost. Even on issues of higher priority than narcotics, the pace of progress in Nepal can be discouraging according to American observers in Kathmandu. This point has been made to the UN representatives in Nepal. The Ambassador is of the opinion that, if the Government of Nepal would accept UN help in strengthening its internal legislation regarding drug-producing crops and in improving the training of its law enforcement personnel

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as proposed by the UN, the project would maintain the important element of an integrated approach to the fundamental problem, even if the international conventions aspect has to be postponed until the Nepalese are in a more receptive mind. In any event, the UN effort thus far is viewed by American observers in Kathmandu as useful when viewed as part of a steady pressure on various fronts. They underscore the necessity of setting sights on long-range objectives rather than on short-term goals and immediate successes. [REDACTED]

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SINGAPORE: NARCOTICS SHIPMENTS THROUGH SINGAPORE HAVE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY IN RECENT MONTHS. Although narcotics seizures in Singapore for the period January through April 1978 have been normal in terms of Singapore's enforcement efforts, narcotics shipments placed aboard commercial aircraft in Singapore and seized in Europe have increased significantly during that period, according to the Embassy in Singapore. All European seizures involved have been traced to the Singapore airport where they have been loaded, or carried, aboard commercial aircraft. In some cases, the heroin was smuggled into Singapore over the Causeway; in other instances the shipment was placed aboard the aircraft in another country, but when the plane landed in Singapore, the defendants collected the luggage, walked through customs, and proceeded to board European-bound flights. Although planned intensified interdiction measures will greatly tax Singapore's resources, Customs officials are planning a new major effort to disrupt the increasing transit traffic in narcotics. [REDACTED]

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TURKEY: OPIUM PRODUCTION TO BE LESS THAN LAST YEAR BUT WILL ADD TO SURPLUS PROBLEM. The mid-June projection of this year's opium poppy straw production in Turkey anticipates a crop of some 30,000 metric tons, about 18 percent less than last year, according to US officials in Ankara. The area under cultivation, including spring planting, is approximately 50,000 hectares, about 30 percent less than last year. Because of the large carryover from previous years' crops--about 30,500 tons--most of the new crop probably will have to be stored outside. This

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will increase the danger of weather damage, but the Turks have not been troubled too much by this factor because they have developed a good method of outside storage on well-covered wooden pallets which has kept deterioration to a minimum. The opium alkaloid plant for processing poppy straw, which is being constructed by a German firm in southwestern Turkey near the city of Afyon--translated "opium"--is nearing completion and is expected to begin operating early next year.

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BULGARIA--Polish Report on Narcotics Trafficking in Bulgaria--TNDD, No. L/7832, 15 June 1978, pp. 15-18. This is a corrected version of an article which appeared in the JPRS No. L/7759, 5 May 1978, pp. 69-72, and highlighted in the 24 May 78 issue of the INBR. The correction notes the seizure of nearly 49 metric tons of illicit drugs by Bulgarian customs inspectors during 1977.

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*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.

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COLOMBIA--Piracy: Traffickers Said to Seize "Lost"
Vessels--TNDD, No. L/7832, pp. 27-33. Many of the
small craft and fishing boats reportedly sunk or
otherwise "lost" in the Gulf of Mexico area have
actually fallen victim to piracy by narcotics smug-
glers. Fishing boats, in particular, because of

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their ease of movement, their facility in evading physical controls, and maneuverability, have long been chosen by international drug smuggling rings for transporting marijuana in large quantities to the waters off the United States.

COLOMBIA--Investigative Unit "Busts" Major Trafficking Ring--TNDD, No. L/7832, pp. 35-38. In shutting down the cocaine-processing laboratories and seizing large quantities of marijuana and other drugs scheduled for export, Colombia's F-2 dealt a blow to drug traffickers. Valued at an estimated \$824,000, the drugs had been accumulated throughout the year by members of the drug ring which transported them by canoe. The dealers had their camp in the midst of the jungle in various buildings built over a large marsh whose waters were infested with piranhas. The smugglers planned it this way to prevent the authorities from approaching for fear of being devoured by the ferocious fish. The site was chosen because of its proximity to the channel running into the Ariari River, and the "big dealers" reportedly came there to conduct their transactions.

HONG KONG--New Tactics in Drug War--TNDD, No. L/7818, p. 36. Customs officers at Kai Tak Airport are spreading their net to catch drug traffickers entering Hong Kong from "new" departure points. Searches are now being made of people coming from what officers term "nonsuspect" cities such as Manila, Seoul, and Tokyo. According to Hong Kong Customs officers, there are indications that narcotics traffickers have started sending drugs via these cities in an effort to evade detection. Two recent arrests have confirmed this new trend, according to the officers. Hong Kong is increasing the number of Customs officers stationed at the airport.

HONG KONG--Drug Watch on Pakistani Nationals--TNDD, No. L/7832, p. 3. Customs officers in Hong Kong are keeping a close watch on several Pakistanis following intelligence reports of increased smuggling from Pakistan. Any ship or aircraft from Pakistan will now come under close scrutiny. The new alert began when Pakistan Customs officers discovered 84 kilograms of raw opium on board a freighter bound

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for the Philippines and Hong Kong. Another 32 kilograms were found on the ship by the captain. Other reports have pinpointed Hong Kong as a center for drug shipments from Pakistan. The drugs are brought in by ship crew members and then dispatched to other Southeast Asian centers. Largely as a result of the more stringent Customs procedures in Hong Kong, drug carrying ships reportedly are being diverted to Malaysia. The opium also reportedly has been treated in a way which deprives it of its characteristic giveaway smell, making detection more difficult.

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KUWAIT--African Diplomats Arrested for Smuggling Narcotics--TNDD, No. L/7832, p. 51. Intelligence agents in Kuwait reportedly have arrested two African diplomats working in the Embassies of Cameroon and Chad in Saudi Arabia. They have been charged with trying to smuggle narcotic pills to Saudi Arabia via Kuwait airport to market them during the pilgrimage season. About 1 million narcotics pills were involved. When the suitcases containing the pills were discovered, the two Africans admitted the smuggling attempt. Neither the Republic of Chad nor Cameroon has an embassy in Kuwait; therefore, there apparently was no question of diplomatic immunity.

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NETHERLANDS--Bangkok-Amsterdam Heroin Route Reportedly Cut--TNDD, No. L/7818, p. 140. The police of Amsterdam, Hilversum, Bussum, Laren, and Schiphol claim to have recently put an end to the heroin traffic between Bangkok and Amsterdam. Twelve persons, among them seven Chinese residing in Holland illegally, have been arrested. Between last October and late April of this year, the Dutch police intercepted five transports, some going via Madrid, Paris, and Brussels, and confiscated 60 kilograms of heroin. A 38-year-old ethnic Chinese from Hong Kong, who was arrested recently in Bangkok, is believed to be the organizer of this particular narcotics trafficking route.

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